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THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK
PRODUCT IMMUNITY DOCTRINE FOR THE
CORPORATE CLIENT
Nancy C. Codyt

Corporate counsel are charged with the task of protecting information relayed to them or compiled at the behest of a client. This
article examines problems encountered by corporate counsel attempting to invoke the attorney-client privilege or work product
immunity doctrine to protect information. The author recommends that corporate counsel implement procedures designed to
retain confidentiality and remain abreast of modifications in
case law pertaining to attorney-client privilege and work product
immunity. The confidentiality of corporate information is best
preserved by adherence to an organized system of procedures for
gathering information.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the day-to-day activities of corporate counsel, the attorney-client
privilege and the work product immunity doctrine are seldom of more
than peripheral concern. Attorneys for corporations, whether corporate
employees or outside counsel, communicate freely with company directors, officers, and employees under the assumption that the contents of
such communications, resulting memoranda, and reports will remain
confidential. Should the matters under discussion become the subject of
litigation, however, application of the attorney-client privilege and the
work product immunity doctrine is not as automatic or comprehensive
as counsel might expect.
Court rulings concerning the attorney-client and work product privileges identify recurring pitfalls for counsel when these doctrines are invoked in corporate litigation. A voidance of these pitfalls requires
awareness and advance planning. Counsel should establish procedures
for obtaining information and providing legal services that maximize the
client's ability to protect confidential communications from disclosure in
subsequent litigation. This article examines the status of the attorneyclient privilege and the work product immunity doctrine in the corporate
setting and offers practical suggestions to assist corporate counsel in their
efforts to avoid loss or waiver of the protections these legal principles
afford corporate clients.
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II.

OVERVIEW OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT AND WORK
PRODUCT IMMUNITY PRIVILEGES

Reliance on the advice of counsel enables both corporations and individuals to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law. When
legal proceedings arise, the adversary system anticipates that attorneys
for each side will prepare their cases thoroughly and independently,
without taking unfair advantage of their opponent's trial preparation.
The attorney-client privilege and the work product immunity doctrine
are intended to advance these legal and social aims. In practice, both the
attorney-client privilege and the work product immunity doctrine protect
the privacy between a client and his attorney, which promotes the candid
exchange of information that is necessary to develop a comprehensive
litigation strategy.

A.

Attorney-Client Privilege

Confidentiality for attorney-client communications is one of the oldest testimonial privileges recognized at common law. l Modern development of this rule in case law reflects the practical purpose of the attorneyclient privilege: to promote clients' freedom of consultation with legal
advisors. 2 In order to provide their clients with competent representation, attorneys must be advised fully regarding their clients' circumstances. Clients, on the other hand, cannot entrust their problems to their
attorneys without some assurance against compulsory disclosure of such
information.
Although the attorney-client privilege originated in the common
law,3it is codified in specific statutes in numerous jurisdictions. 4 The
classic formulation of the attorney-client privilege is set forth in United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.:5
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the
communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court,
or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communica1. Kelway v. Kelway, 21 Eng. Rep. 47 (Ch. 1580); Waldron v. Ward, 82 Eng. Rep. 853
(K.B. 1654). See generally 8 J. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2990, at 542-43 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Maryland follows the common law in granting clients a
privilege against disclosure of communications with their attorneys. Trupp v. Wolff,
24 Md. App. 588, 335 A.2d 171 (1975).
2. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); see also 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE ~ 26.606 (2d ed. 1984).
3. J. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 204-42 (3d ed. 1984).
4. See, e.g., ALASKA R. EVID. 503; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2234 (1982); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062 (1978); ARK. UNIF. R. EVID. 502; CAL. EVID. CODE
§§ 950-62 (West 1966); DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 502; HAWAII R. EVID. 503; ME. R.
EVID. 502; MICHIGAN G.C.R. 1963, Rule 306.2; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 49.03549.115 (1971); N.M.R. EVID. 503; ORE. REV. STAT. § 40.225 (1981); TEX. R.
EVID. 503; VT. R. EVID. S02; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.03 (West 1975).
S. 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
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tion is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a
fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client
(b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for
the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege
has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
In short, where legal advice is sought from a professional legal advisor in
his capacity as such, the communications relevant to that purpose, made
in confidence by the client, are at the instance of the client permanently
protected from disclosure, unless the protection is waived. 6

B.

Work Product Immunity Doctrine

In the landmark case of Hickman v. Taylor, 7 an action for the
wrongful death of a seaman in a tug boat accident, the United States
Supreme Court established a qualified immunity from discovery for
materials prepared by or for an attorney in anticipation of litigation or in
preparation for trial. 8 The plaintiffs in Hickman attempted to compel the
production of statements that the tug owners' attorney, with an eye toward future litigation, had taken from witnesses shortly after the accident. 9 The Supreme Court, interpreting the discovery provisions in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, \0 held the statements privileged, citing
the general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney's trial preparation, II absent compelling reasons that justify such invasion. 12
6. Wonneman v. Stratford Sec. Co., 23 F.R.D. 281, 285 (D.N.Y. 1959). See generally
C. WRIGHT & W. MILLER, 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2017 (1970)
(discussing scope of attorney-client privilege). In the context of privilege, waiver can
be inferred. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Peyton, 243 F. Supp. 907, 909 (E.D. Va. 1965) (client
who challenged his attorney's conduct of his case was held to have waived the privilege as to confidential communications with the attorney).
7. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
8. Id. at 510-12.
9. Id. at 498.
10. In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly limited discovery in only
two instances: 1) where the deposition was conducted in bad faith or in such a
manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry, FED.
R. CIV. P. 30(b); and 2) where the requested information touched upon irrelevant
matters or encroached upon the recognized domains of privilege, FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b). The Supreme Court, however, found that "the memoranda, statements, and
mental impressions in issue in [Hickman fell] outside the scope of the attorney-client
privilege and hence [were] not protected from discovery on that basis." 329 U.S. at
507-08.
11. The Court stated:
Proper preparation of a client's case demands that [the attorney] assemble
information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant
facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and
needless interference. . . . Were such materials open to opposing counsel
on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain
unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his
own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop
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As presently codified in the Federal Civil Rules, the work product
immunity doctrine is broader in scope than the attorney-client privilege.
Fedetal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) provides:
A party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things
otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or
agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery
has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his
case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing
has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of
an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation.
Although the work product immunity doctrine and the attorneyclient privilege are closely related, there are significant differences in application. For example, although "work product" may be that of an attorney, the concept of "work product" is not confined to information or
materials gathered or assembled by a lawyer.I3 Furthermore, "a communication may be immune from discovery as work product even though it
was not made to or by a client of an attorney."14 Unlike the attorneyclient privilege, however, work product immunity applies only to documents prepared in anticipation of litigation, not to documents prepared
for ordinary business purposes. IS In addition, the work product immunity doctrine may be defeated by a showing that the protected information is crucial to the case and the same or substantially equivalent
information cannot be obtained by the other side without undue hard-

12.

13.

14.
15.

in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The
effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing and the interests of
the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.
329 U.S. at 511.
/d. at 512-14.
The work product immunity doctrine also can apply to material such as deposition
summaries prepared by paralegals, reports of private investigators hired by the attorney, indices to documents prepared by clerical personnel at the attorney's request, and similar items. See generally M. LARKIN, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL
PRIVILEGES § 11.02 & n.47 (1985).
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 603 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
Cf lanicker v. George Washington Univ., 94 F.R.D. 648,650 (D.D.C. 1982) (safety
records of minor accidents kept as a routine business matter to reduce risks to employees or to satisfy an insurance carrier may be considered ordinary business
records, rather than work product, particularly if the records are not made upon
advice of counselor are not kept confidential). As is evident from Janicker, the
distinction between documents prepared in anticipation of litigation and documents
prepared for an ordinary business purpose is not always an easy one to make.
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ship.16 Moreover, like the attorney-client privilege, the protection afforded to work product documents can be waived. 17
Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that if a
court orders production of work product materials, the court "shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions
or legal theories of the attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation." IS Some courts have held that such material enjoys
a new absolute privilege; 19 other courts, however, simply have required a
stronger showing of need and hardship to overcome the privilege. 20 Because the Supreme Court has declined to resolve this conflict, 2 I work
product containing such information as that ostensibly protected by Rule
26(b)(3) remains at risk of disclosure.
The application of Rule 26(b)(3) to work product generally requires
in camera review of the documents sought to determine the applicability
of the immunity doctrine and to protect privileged material from unwarranted scrutiny. Even states that restrict the scope of work product immunity provide a privilege for "mental impression" work product. 22
Often, when work product documents are ordered disclosed pursuant to
a finding of substantial need and undue hardship, it has been suggested
that courts should permit material reflecting the attorney's thought
processes to be redacted before the documents are produced to the oppo16. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1982). "Undue hardship"
generally is considered something more than mere inconvenience or expense; it is
found only when opposing counsel cannot obtain substantially equivalent information elsewhere. /d.
17. Western Fuels Ass'n v. Burlington N.R.R., 102 F.R.D. 201, 203 (D. Wyo. 1984);
see infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). Examples of such material include documents reflecting
an attorney's discovery plan, trial strategy, legal research and theories, and evaluations of the strengths and weaknesses of an opponent's case. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 8, 1979, 622 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1979); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 598 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
19. See, e.g., In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1080 (4th Cir. 1981) (opinion work product
enjoys near absolute immunity and can be discovered only in very rare and extraordinary circumstances), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); In re Murphy, 560
F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977) (same); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412 F. Supp.
943, 949 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (same).
20. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1979) (government unable to meet higher burden of need and hardship to compel corporation
to produce employee interview memoranda); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. V.
Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970) (good cause shown by plaintiffs seeking document prepared by defendant's counsel following his client's testimony before a
grand jury), affd, 400 U.S. 348 (1971) (Court equally divided); Xerox Corp. V.
I.B.M., 64 F.R.D. 367, 377-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (plaintiff made sufficient showing of
good cause where 23 key witnesses in trade secrets case were interviewed by defendant but were not available for plaintiff to examine).
21. Upjohn V. United States, 449 U.S. 383,401 (1981); see infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
22. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 lOA, § 201(b)(2) (1979); PA. R. CIV. P. 4003.3.
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nent. 23 For a communication or document to be privileged, it must remain confidential. Generally, when an attorney-client communication24
or trial preparation materiaP5 is shared with an outsider the privilege is .
destroyed.

III.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN APPLYING THE ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE IN THE CORPORATE
SETTING.

In the corporate setting, unique problems arise regarding the application of the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity doctrine. Questions that are relatively simple in the context of individual
representation often become much more complex in corporate practice.
For example, in the representation of a corporation, the determination of
who is the "client," is not always clear; nor is it always certain from
whom confidential material may be withheld. 26 Furthermore, the distinction between privileged legal advice or work done "in anticipation of litigation" and unprivileged ordinary business communications is often
quite subtle. 27 Moreover, various actions engaged in by corporations are
deemed to waive these protections, and such actions may affect the assertion of the attorney-client privilege and the work product immunity doctrine by individual officers or directors regarding their communications
with corporate counsel. 28 The corporation also is faced with the dilemma
of maintaining forthright and cooperative relationships with federal regulatory agencies, while contemporaneously attempting to preserve the
confidentiality necessary for the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity doctrine. 29 These concerns generally do not arise during
the representation of individual clients. The interests of individual clients
usually are identified easily and are not complicated by the involvement
of numerous officers, employees, and agents. Moreover, privileges as23. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1979) (government
agreed to redaction of opinion work product); see also Hodgson v. Keller Brass, 56
F.R.D. 126 (1972) (extent to which attorney work product will be protected must be
judged by court on an ad hoc basis).
24. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1357(4th Cir. 1984).
25. Duplan Corp. v. Deering-Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976).
26. See infra notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
28. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. 986 (1985) (new
corporate management may waive attorney-client privilege as to communications
made by former officers and directors); see also Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Deramas, 313 F.
Supp. 224 (D. Del. 1970).
29. To the extent these issues are not addressed in this article, the reader is referred to
recent publications dealing with corporate privilege. Mathews, Internal Corporate
Investigations, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 655 (1984); Dorris, The Limited Waiver Rule: Creation of an SEC-Corporation Privilege, 36 STAN. L. REV. 789 (1984); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporate Client: Where Do We Go After UpJohn?, 81
MICH. L. REV. 665 (1983); Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (1982).
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serted by individual clients generally do not implicate fiduciary relationships such as those between a corporation and its shareholders.
Courts are reluctant to shield information from discovery and generally require a clear showing that the requirements of the privilege, including absence of waiver, have been met. 30 It is important to remember
that evidentiary privileges are strictly construed,31 and that the burden of
asserting and establishing the privileged nature of a document or communication falls upon the party resisting discovery.32 Hence, protecting
clients from the consequences of an adverse ruling on privilege is not an
easy task. Corporate attorneys must acquaint themselves with the legal
principles governing the attorney-client privilege and the work product
immunity doctrine and adhere to practices that are most likely to result
in maintaining privileged status for sensitive information. Because of the
lack of concrete standards and direction from the Supreme Court, attorneys also need to keep abreast of changes in their jurisdiction's case law
in this area. 33
Successful assertion of the privilege for attorney-client communications and work product in the corporate setting requires attention to the
factual circumstances surrounding the communications in question. If a
district court finds that a privilege is being asserted in furtherance of a
crime or fraud, for example, the privilege will not be upheld. 34 If the
communication sought to be protected appears to involve only ordinary
business matters, as opposed to legal advice,assertion of privilege will
not be upheld. 35 Disclosing privileged material to outside parties ordinarily waives the privilege. 36 Any "testimonial use" of the material, such as
providing privileged material to an expert witness during preparation for
his deposition or trial testimony, also will result in a waiver.J7 Often, if a
privilege applicable to certain subject matter is waived, courts will require disclosure to the opponent of all information relevant to that subject matter.38 The corporation's waiver of the privilege may have
30. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979). "[B]ecause the privilege obstructs the search for the truth and because its benefits are, at best, 'indirect
and speculative,' it must be 'strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits
consistent with the logic of its principle'. " 559 F.2d at 1224 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE
ON EVIDENCE § 2291, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961».
31. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,389 (1981); United States v. King, 536
F. Supp. 253 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
32. Weil v. Investment/lndicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th
Cir. 1981); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
33. See infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
34. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept.15, 1983,731 F.2d 1032, 1038
(2d Cir. 1984); In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235,
1242 (5th Cir. 1982).
35. United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1039-40 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862
(1981); Barr Marine Prod. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631, 634 (E.D. Pa.
1979).
36. Detection Sys., Inc. v. Pittway Corp., 96 F.R.D. 152 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
37. Computer Network Corp. v. Spohler, 95 F.R.D. 500, 502 (D. D.C. 1982).
38. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 1146, 1162 (D.S.C. 1975) (vol-
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ramifications beyond the corporation itself. For example, waiver of the
attorney-client privilege by the corporation may be held to waive the
privilege as to individual employees' communications with corporate
counsel. 39 The eventual result of waiver in subsequent civil or criminal
litigation, of course, can have substantial impact on corporate liabilities
and, ultimately, on the value of corporate shares and debt instruments.
IV.

A.

CURRENT STATUS OF THE CORPORATE ATTORNEYCLIENT AND WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGES IN
CASE LAW
The Supreme Court

In Upjohn Co. v. United States,4fJ the Supreme Court reaffirmed application of the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity
doctrine to the rendition of legal services in the corporate setting. The
Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege did not apply solely
to communications between corporate counsel and the so-called "control
group" of key corporate officers and executives authorized to act upon
counsel's advice, a rule that had been adopted by a number of federal
courtS.41 Instead, the Court held that the attorney-client privilege encompasses communications between corporate counsel and lower level employees when the employees are aware that the communication is
undertaken to allow the corporation to obtain legal advice. 42 Under
Upjohn, a corporate employee's communication to corporate counsel,
made at the direction of his superior regarding matters within the scope

39.
40.

41.

42.

untary disclosure of one or more privileged documents passed between attorney and
client waives the privilege as to all communications between the same attorney and
client on the same subject matter).
Citibank, N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1195 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. granted sub
nom. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. 321 (1984); In
re Grand Jury Investigation, 575 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
449 U.S. 383 (1981). Upjohn involved a pharmaceutical firm's internal investigation
of alleged overseas bribes to foreign governments. During the course of the investigation, undertaken at the behest of the company's general counsel, low-level managerial employees were required to answer questionnaires concerning such payments.
The IRS issued a summons demanding production of both the questionnaires and
memoranda concerning employee interviews. Id. at 386-89.
The so-called "control group" test first was articulated in City of Philadelphia v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962), petition jor mandamus & prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d
742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). The control group test gained
a large following in subsequent decisions. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d
1224 (3d Cir. 1979); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); Garrison v.
General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 81 F.R.D. 691 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.
1979); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipping & Dry Dock, 68 F.R.D. 397
(E.D. Va. 1975); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974);
Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970); see also
Mead Data Cent. v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 253 n.24
(1977).
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391-97.
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of the employee's job responsibilities, constitutes a privileged attorneyclient communication. The Upjohn decision similarly affirmed that the
work product immunity doctrine, set forth in Hickman v. Taylor4 3 and
codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), applies to documents generated by or on behalf of corporate counsel. The Upjohn decision makes it clear that "work product" refers not only to documents
prepared by an attorney, but also to work done by others at counsel's
direction in preparation for litigation. 44 Work product materials that reflect an attorney's mental impressions, theories, and strategy concerning
impending litigation may be withheld from discovery, despite the opponent's asserted need for such materials or the hardship resulting from
nondisclosure. 45
Although clearly helpful to corporate counsel seeking to invoke the
attorney-client privilege or the work product immunity doctrine, the
Upjohn decision left a number of questions unanswered. In rejecting the
"control group" standard, the majority refused to articulate a test for
application of the corporate attorney-client privilege. Instead, the Upjohn
majority expressly called for a case-by-case approach consistent with the
ground rules set forth in Hickman, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26,
and the Upjohn opinion. 46 Moreover, the Court did not indicate what
type or degree of "substantial need" or "undue hardship" must be shown
to overcome a valid claim of work product protection for trial preparation materials. 47 Although the majority opinion suggests that attorney
work product reflecting mental impressions, theories, opinions, and litigation strategy is absolutely privileged, the Court also left this issue open
to further debate. 48
In summary, the Upjohn decision leaves corporate attorneys in an
uncertain position. Communications with corporate employees and trial
preparation efforts sought by the other side mayor may not be discoverable, depending upon the attending circumstances and case law in individual jurisdictions. 49
Since Upjohn, the Supreme Court has not refined the flexible stan43. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
44. 449 U.S. at 387-88.
45. Id. at 401. The type of work product material subsumed under this general description is subject to considerable dispute. A distinction has been made between an attorney's mere recordation of observed facts and the "opinions of the attorney."
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1218-19 (4th Cir. 1976); see
also United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 89 F.R.D. 578, 585 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
46. 449 U.S. at 396-97.
47. Id. at 401-02.
48. [d.
49. For example, under Maryland case law, communications made by the client to a
psychiatrist for the purpose of seeking legal advice are within the scope of the attorney-client privilege if the psychiatrist is retained to assist the attorney in rendering
legal advice. Pratt v. State, 39 Md. App. 442, 387 A.2d 779 (1978). This privilege
does not apply if the psychiatrist is consulted for treatment rather than to assist the
attorney. [d. Such communications may not be considered within the attorney-client privilege in other jurisdictions.
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dards for application of the attorney-client privilege to corporations. In a
recent decision, however, the Court limited the scope of work product
immunity for materials generated in preparation for litigation. In United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 50 the Court held that a corporate taxpayer
could not assert a privilege for the work product of an outside accounting
firm employed by the corporation to assure compliance with federal securities laws. The Second Circuit had given work product immunity to
tax accrual papers that were prepared by the corporation's independent
auditors and sought pursuant to an IRS subpoena. 51 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the public interest in promoting
full disclosure to public accountants, which in turn promoted the integrity of the securities market, required that work such as that performed
by independent auditors be protected. 52
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that no accountant-client privilege or work product immunity attached to the tax
accrual work papers. The special duties undertaken by certified public
accountants to protect the general public were found to transcend their
employment relationship with the client. The Court noted that should
the SEC or a private litigant seek access to such documents, "they would
surely be entitled to do SO."53 The Court therefore held that the IRS also
should have access to the material because the need for full disclosure to
the government outweighed the interest in encouraging corporate clients
to disclose to their independent accountants. 54
The Arthur Young decision leaves corporations without work product protection for "compliance assurance" audits conducted by public
accountants. The decision leaves open the possibility, however, that the
privilege will be preserved if such audits are conducted by in-house auditors under the supervision of the corporations' general counsel. An alternative course of action that would preserve the privilege is for the
corporation to hire an outside law firm to supervise the investigation and
allow the law firm to retain its own accounting consultants. Use of these
types of alternatives demonstrates more emphatically the litigation-related purpose of the accounting services and the nexus between the audits
and the rendition of legal advice. Neither of these courses of action, however, will render the results of such audits confidential unless litigation is
SO.
51.
52.
53.

465 U.S. 80S (1984).
677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), affd in part & rev'd in part, 465 U.S. 820 (1984).
Id. at 220-21.
465 U.S. at 820; see Securities Act of 1933, § 19,48 Stat. 85,15 U.S.c. § 77s(b) (For
purposes of "all necessary and proper" investigations, the Securities and Exchange
Commission is empowered to "require the production of any books, papers, or other
documents which the commission deems relevant or material to the inquiry.").
54. 465 U.S. at 821. The court stated that, "[b]eyond question it is desirable and in the
public interest to encourage full disclosure by corporate clients to their independent
accountants; if it is necessary to balance competing interests, however, the need of
the government for full disclosure . . . must also weigh in the balance." Id.
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foreseeable; routine audits for business unrelated to present or prospective legal actions will not be privileged.
B.

Recent Lower Court Decisions

Lack of Supreme Court guidance has left the lower federal courts in
disagreement as to the application of the attorney-client privilege and
work product immunity doctrine in the corporate setting. Attempts by
the lower federal courts to apply Upjohn to cases concerning the application of the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity doctrine
to corporate parties have produced divergent results.
1.

Shareholder and Derivative Suits

A controversial issue in recent years has been whether corporate
managers can assert the attorney-client privilege or work product immunity doctrine in shareholder and derivative suits. In these suits, typically
one or more shareholders sue the corporation directly or institute proceedings against corporate management individually or "derivatively" as
representatives of the corporation itself, challenging decisions that affect
the company or the value of its stock. 55 At first blush, it seems anomalous that the management of a corporation should have an evidentiary
privilege to withhold from the corporation's shareholders information
from attorneys who ostensibly are acting on the corporation's behalf. As
a practical matter, however, both shareholder and derivative suits pit
corporate management and the majority shareholders against an individual shareholder or a disgruntled minority of shareholders in a confrontation where mutuality of the parties' interests has been destroyed. In view
of this adversarial relationship, a corporation ordinarily is entitled to assert attorney-client privilege and work product immunity against the
plaintiff shareholders. 56
In Garner v. Wolfinbarger,57 the Fifth Circuit created a significant
loophole in the corporate attorney-client privilege. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that if shareholders charge
that corporate management is acting inimically to those shareholders'
55. Shareholder derivative suits are creatures of state law and are subject to state procedural rules. Steinberg v. Hardy, 90 F. Supp. 167, 169 (D. Conn. 1950).
56. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103 (5th Cir. 1970), cerro denied, 401 U.S.
974 (1971); see also Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholders'Suits,
69 COLUM. L. REV. 309 (1969) (criticizing the shareholder exception created by the
federal district court in Garner V. Wolfinbarger, 280 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ala.
1968».
57. 430 F.2d 1093, 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). The case
involved a class action brought by shareholders against an insurance company and
its officers alleging violations of federal and state securities law and common-law
fraud. The shareholders attempted to recover the purchase price they and similarly
situated shareholders had paid for their stock. The dissident shareholders sought to
depose the attorney handling the corporation's issuance of stock. At issue was advice given by the attorney to the corporation concerning the stock and its sale. The
shareholders also sought production of related legal documents. [d. at 1095.
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interests, the availability of the attorney-client privilege is subject to the
shareholders' right to show cause why the privilege should not be upheld. 58 The Garner court reasoned that it was anomalous to allow the
privilege automatically under all circumstances, because the corporation's attorneys ultimately are supposed to act on the shareholders' behalf. 59 In ruling on privilege claims in derivative or shareholder suits, the
Garner court found these factors relevant:
1) the colorable nature of the shareholder's claim;
2) the shareholder's good faith;
3) the necessity or desirability for the shareholder to have the
information;
4) whether the information is available elsewhere;
5) whether the claim alleges activity that is criminal, illegal, or of
merely doubtful legality;
6) whether the communication relates to past or prospective
actions;
7) whether the communication sought is related to the shareholder's suit;
8) the specificity of information sought (no fishing expeditions);
and
9) the risk of revealing trade secrets or other information the corporation seeks to keep confidential for reasons extraneous to the
litigation. 6O
Courts attempting to apply Garner have reached conflicting results,
largely due to differing views on the weight that should be given to the
competing interests and policies involved in such disputes. On occasion,
lower courts deny application of. the attorney-client privilege, only to
have the privilege reinstated on appeal. In Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co. v. Kaplan ,61 a class action and derivative antitrust suit, the
district court reversed the magistrate's decision that the plaintiffs had
established grounds for depriving the defendants of their attorney-client
privilege. 62 In its decision, the district court relied upon the following
facts: 1) plaintiffs' representation of fewer than one percent of Sealy'S
shares; 2) the information sought by the plaintiffs pertained to past conduct, not to the shareholder litigation; and 3) the disclosure of the information could be used against the corporation in individual litigation
between the plaintiffs and Sealy.
58. Id. at 1103-04.
59. Id. at 1101.
60. Id. at 1103-04.
61. 90 F.R.D. 21 (N.D. Ill. 1980), affd sub nom. Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v.
Sealy, Inc., 669 F.2d 490 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982). The plaintiff
shareholders in Sealy, who held only 0.7 percent of Sealy shares, filed a class action
antitrust suit challenging certain corporate actions involving corporate licensees.
Id. at 23-25.
62. Id. at 30-31.
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Similarly, in In re International Systems & Controls Corp. Securities
Litigation,63 shareholders' derivative and class action suits were brought
against International Systems and Controls and its board of directors,
alleging fraud and violations of federal securities laws. 64 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas attempted to extend the good cause exception of Garner by ruling that plaintiffs could
have access to certain work product materials produced by ISC attorneys
in connection with an internal corporate investigation of questionable
overseas payments. 65 On appeal of the discovery order, the Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that once there is sufficient anticipation of litigation to
trigger work product immunity, the mutuality of interest between dissident shareholders and corporate management is destroyed. 66 Under such
circumstances, the plaintiff shareholders cannot discover work product
of corporate attorneys absent a showing of substantial need, undue hardship, or both.67
In the International Systems decision, the Fifth Circuit expressly declined to extend the Garner holding to work product immunity.68 Failure
to recognize that the "mutuality of interest" between shareholder and
management ceases to exist in shareholder litigation, the court observed,
"would be to ignore modern corporate realities. "69 Two parties anticipating litigation against each other do not have a common interest. It is not
reasonable to indulge in the fiction that counsel, hired by management,
also is hired constructively by the party against whom counsel is expected to defend. 70 Furthermore, because the shareholders had not provided prima facie proof that fraudulent or criminal activity was
underway in connection with preparation of the work product materials
sought to be discovered, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit refused to require disclosure. 71
Other courts also have limited the scope of Garner. In Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc.,72 the Ninth Circuit
held that Garner did not apply to a class action, other than a derivative
suit, brought by someone other than a current corporate shareholder.?3
63. 693 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1982). The case was a shareholder derivative suit alleging
that company representatives paid illegal bribes in the form of "commissions" to
foreign officials to secure contracts in the Middle East. Independent directors, an
outside law firm, and the accounting firm of Arthur Young & Co. (the company's
regular outside auditor) formed an internal "special audit committee" to investigate
the payments. /d. at 1237.
64. 693 F.2d at 1237.
65. In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 97 F.R.D. 552 (S.D. Tex.
1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1983).
66. 693 F.2d at 1239.
67. Id. at 1239-40.
68. Id. at 1240.
69. Id. at 1239.
70.Id.
71. Id. at 1242-43.
72. 647 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1981).
73. Id. at 23. In Weii, a mutual fund shareholder who had suffered substantial losses
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
where former rather than present stock owners are involved, the Garner
holding and policy rationale do not apply.14 Likewise, in In re Dayco
Corp.,75 the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, following the Fifth Circuit's lead, required a showing of substantial
need, undue hardship, or both before plaintiffs in a derivative action
could obtain access to the work product,of the corporation's attorneys.1 6
Nevertheless, courts continue to pay lip service to Garner, while finding
in most cases that the requirements for application of the Garner rationale have not been met. 77
Although the Garner decision remains viable, corporate counsel
must be alert to the possibility that, in an appropriate case, a trial court
will refuse to recognize an attorney-client privilege for communications
between the corporation and its attorneys in shareholder or derivative
suits. This possibility should be anticipated, particularly if the circumstances favoring disclosure, as set forth in Garner, are present. To maximize the corporation's chances of prevailing on a claim of privilege,
careful documentation of the involvement of counsel and the litigationrelated purposes must be maintained.
2.

Corporate Housekeeping

Another area of controversy in recent years has been the extent to
which the fruits of in-house corporate investigations into suspected employee wrongdoing are discoverable. During the 1970's, allegations of
improper payments for overseas contracts, political "slush funds," and
other types of sub rosa conduct among corporate employees led to the
widespread practice of retaining outside counsel or accounting firms, or
establishing an in-house committee, to determine the nature and extent
of wrongdoing. Such committees often confidentially interview employees, review corporate records, and issue reports or memoranda summarizing their findings and conclusions. In subsequent litigation,

74.
75.

76.

77.

filed suit against the fund and certain of its officers and directors, alleging violations
of numerous securities laws. During the course of discovery, the plaintiff attempted
to obtain answers to interrogatories concerning communications between officers of
the fund and corporate counsel retained to assure compliance with state "Blue Sky"
laws. Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 23. The court reasoned that Garner was inapplicable in cases where former
shareholders sought damages on their own behalf, because corporate attorneys act
for the corporation and its present shareholders.
99 F.R.D. 616 (S.D. Ohio 1983). This case involved a shareholders' derivative action alleging securities violations in the form of phantom commissions paid to a
broker on the basis of nonexistent overseas contracts. The plaintiffs moved to compel production of a "Report of Counsel to the Special Review Committee of the
Board of Directors of the Dayco Corporation," prepared by the committee and retained counsel in anticipation of litigation. Id. at 618 n.1.
Id. at 621.
See Lewis, Garner Is Alive and Well in Securities Litigation, 69 A.B.A. J. 903
(1983).
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corporations have attempted, with varying degrees of success, to claim
that the attorney-client privilege shields these materials from discoveryJ8
In Upjohn Co. v. United States,79 the Supreme Court held that the
attorney-client privilege protected the reports of an in-house corporate
committee from IRS subpoena. Upjohn has been followed by the lower
federal courts. In Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Lemay,80 the
plaintiff corporation hired a litigation consultant to investigate violations
of employment contracts and wrongful appropriation of business information allegedly perpetrated by former employees. The defendants
sought a ruling that would have allowed them to depose the consultant
about his conversations with in-house counsel. Applying Upjohn, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that
the consultant's conversations with in-house counsel were protected from
discovery by the corporation's attorney-client privilege. 81 The court
made it clear, however, that the attorney-client privilege did not preclude
discovery of the consultant's knowledge of the underlying facts; only the
contents of conversations or other communications with counsel are
protected. 82
In re Dayco Corp. 83 similarly involved the proposed discovery of a
report by an in-house committee investigating improper employee conduct. 84 A "Special Review Committee" comprised of the corporation's
board of directors and outside counsel conducted an investigation into
Dayco's involvement with improper payment of commissions for nonexistent overseas contracts. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that the report containing the committee's
findings and conclusions was protected by the attorney-client privilege,
the work product immunity doctrine, or both.85 Furthermore, the court
held that despite persuasive arguments to the contrary, the privileges had
not been waived or overcome by a showing of substantial need and undue
hardship pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3).86 The
court noted that the individuals interviewed by the committee were available for the plaintiffs to depose and that discovery procedures insured the
78. See, e.g., In re Dayco Corp., 99 F.R.D. at 618; Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 97
F.R.D. 703, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (internal investigation concerning the preparation
of allegedly libelous documentary); Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews and
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 873 (1971).
79. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). For a discussion of Upjohn, see supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
80. 89 F.R.D. 410 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
81. Id. at 415.
82.Id.
83. 99 F.R.D. 616 (S.D. Ohio 1983). For a discussion of the facts involved in In re
Dayco Corp., see supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
84. Id. at 618.
85. Id. at 621.
86. Id. at 620-21. The court found that because the report was protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product immunity doctrine, the Garner good cause
balancing test should be replaced by the stricter substantial need test. Id. at 621.
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production of company documents underlying the report. 87
In In re International Systems & Controls Corp. Securities Litigation,88 a corporation established a "special audit committee" of independent directors who hired a law firm and an accounting firm to
investigate alleged "sensitive payments" to foreign nationals in connection with contract negotiations. The Fifth Circuit held that binders containing information developed during 'the committee's special review
were prima facie protected under the work product immunity doctrine. 89
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to extend Garner to work product materials and held that there had been no
showing of an ongoing crime or fraud sufficient to overcome the immunity accorded work product. 90 The court of appeals remanded the case to
the district court, noting that for the binders to be produced the plaintiff
must make a particularized showing that the equivalent of the subpoenaed work product materials could not be obtained elsewhere. 91
C.

Disclosures to the SEC

As noted previously,92 conversations and documents must be kept
confidential if the client wishes to preserve its right to assert the attorneyclient privilege or work product immunity for such communication. In
the context of publicly held corporations, this principle poses a question
that has been the subject of considerable litigation and dispute: To what
extent does voluntary disclosure of privileged information to government
agencies waive the privilege in subsequent litigation?
Courts ruling on this question have reached conflicting decisions regarding the effect of agency disclosure on evidentiary privileges. One line
of cases, citing the overriding public policy of encouraging full cooperation with and disclosure to federal agencies, holds that a party's voluntary disclosure of privileged information to the SEC does not constitute a
waiver of the privilege in subsequent litigation. 93 The trend in recent
cases, however, is for courts to find that disclosure to federal agencies
87.Id.
88. 91 F.R.D. 552 (S.D. Tex. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1983).
89. 693 F.2d at 1238-39. Although the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's determination that the material was "prepared in anticipation of litigation," it held that
the Garner test was erroneously applied. Id.
90. Id. at 1239-42.
91. Id. at 1240-41.
92. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
93. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979,478 F. Supp. 368, 372-73 (E.D.
Wis. 1979) (IRS subpoena to company attorneys seeking report disclosed informally
to SEC of internal investigation of questionable payments quashed; witnesses interviewed were available to give grand jury testimony and court did not want to discourage cooperation with SEC); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 688
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (securities fraud suit in which attorneys for real estate investment
trust were deposed and their documents sought; documents had been supplied voluntarily to informal, non public SEC investigation to which defendant was not a
party).
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waives the privilege. Courts that find waiver under these circumstances
cite the unfairness of permitting a corporation selectively to waive its
privilege, disclosing the information when it is in the corporation's interest to do so, and withholding that information when it is not. 94 Still other
decisions have attempted to find a middle ground, permitting a corporation to "reserve" the privilege or to make a "limited waiver" in its disclosures to federal agencies by express reservation of rights. 95
A few representative decisions illustrate these positions. In Schnell
v. Schnall,96 the defendant in a derivative suit appealed a magistrate's
ruling that compelled it to produce the transcript of its attorney's voluntary testimony before the SEC. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, citing the "paramount" value of cooperation with the SEC, refused to enter a disclosure order and held that the
corporation had not waived its attorney-client privilege. 97
Similarly, in In re LTV Securities Litigation,98 shareholders sued the
corporation, certain officers, and the corporation's accountants alleging
accounting manipulations. The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas held that materials generated by a "special
officer" and committee appointed by the corporation to implement an
SEC consent decree, as well as materials generated by corporate attorneys in the course of an internal investigation, were privileged under both
the attorney-client privilege and the work product immunity doctrine. 99
94. In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum to Fulbright & Jaworski, 99 F.R.D. 582, 588-89
(D.D.C. 1983), a./f'd, 738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also In re Sealed Case, 676
F.2d 793,807, 817-18, 822-23 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (investigative counsel's compliance
with voluntary disclosure program through submission to the SEC of its reports
waived work product immunity); Maryville Academy v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 559
F. Supp. 79 (N.D. III. 1982) (disclosure of privileged information sought in subpoena constituted a complete waiver). In the Fulbright & Jaworski case, the corporation voluntarily released the product of its law firm's investigation of illegal
overseas payments to the SEC "in confidence." The court nevertheless found waiver
based on the SEC's refusal to accept the law firm's unilateral designation of the
material as "confidential." 99 F.R.D. at 585. In re Sealed Case involved the investigative counsel's report of a company's illegal overseas payments. Citing the disclosure of the report pursuant to the SEC's voluntary disclosure program, the court of
appeals held that any privilege had been waived. 676 F.2d at 824. The plaintiffs in
Maryville were granted access to documents prepared by Loeb Rhoades & Co.'s
counsel that had been turned over to the SEC. The district court emphasized that
confidentiality had not been sought for the documents, despite the SEC's specific
warning that the documents would be subject to public release under the Freedom
of Information Act. 559 F. Supp. at 8-9.
95. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc);
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp. 638,
644-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
96. 550 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
97. Id. at 652-53.
98. 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981). Certain LTV shareholders sued the corporation,
its subsidiary, and various corporate employees and agents alleging conspiracy to
defraud shareholders by overvaluing inventories.
99. Id. at 601-02, 614-18. Acknowledging that special investigative counsel are an "in-
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In Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust,IOO the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that a corporation's disclosures to
the SEC for purposes of a non public informal investigation did not waive
the privilege as to a plaintiff not a party to the SEC proceeding. 101
More recent decisions, however, have reached the opposite result. In
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Fulbright & Jaworski,102 the District of
Columbia Circuit upheld a trial court's ruling that voluntary disclosure
to the SEC constitutes a complete waiver of the attorney-client privilege
and work product immunity doctrine.103 The defendants in shareholder
class action and derivative suits had disclosed to the SEC, pursuant to
the agency's voluntary disclosure program, the results of an outside law
firm's investigation of improper overseas payments. The investigators' final report, as well as notes taken by lawyers during the course of the
investigation, were submitted to the SEC in an effort to secure 1eniency
and to forestall formal SEC investigation and litigation. I04 Disclosure to
the SEC resulted in the waiver of both the attorney-client privilege and
the work product immunity. lOS
The Fulbright & Jaworski decision rested on three grounds: (1) disclosure to the SEC was inconsistent with maintaining the privilege;
(2) the defendants in the shareholder class action and the derivative suit
had no reasonable basis for believing the SEC would keep the data confidential; and (3) a finding of waiver was consistent with the policies behind evidentiary privileges. The "selective waiver" the defendants
sought to assert would abuse the privilege unfairly.106 This rationale has
been followed in other recent decisions including In re Sealed Case,107 in
which the District of Columbia Circuit held that waiver of the privilege
occurs when a corporation participates in the SEC's voluntary disclosure
program.
A compromise position was outlined by the Eighth Circuit in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith.lOs The court held that disclosure of the
results of an in-house "slush fund" investigation pursuant to subpoena in
a separate, non public SEC investigation constituted only a limited waiver
of the attorney-client privilege. 109 To hold otherwise, the court observed,
creasingly common element of consent decrees," the LTV court recognized a hybrid
privilege tailored to the special officer's role in an SEC consent decree. Id. at 620-22.
100. 85 F.R.D. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
101. Id. at 687-89.
102. 738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
103. Id. at 1369-72.
104. Id. at 1370. The SEC's voluntary disclosure program "promises wrongdoers more
lenient treatment and the chance to avoid formal investigation. . . in return for
thorough self-investigation and complete disclosure of the results to the SEC." Id. at
1369.
105. Id. at 1367, 1369-72, 1374-75.
106.Id.
107. 676 F.2d 793, 817-23 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
108. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane).
109. The Eighth Circuit derived its concept of "limited waiver" from two earlier
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would thwart the use of independent counsel to investigate matters on
behalf of the corporation and produce a result that is at odds with the
corporation's interest in obtaining advice that may help it protect the
interests of its investors and customers. 11D
The ramifications of such a "limited waiver" are set forth in Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., III
which contains an explicit exposition of the limited waiver doctrine. The
issue in Teachers was whether a corporate pension fund waived the right
to assert the attorney-client privilege with respect to documents turned
over to the SEC in response to an agency subpoena. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York stated that it
would hold that the pension fund had waived its attorney-client privilege
only if the documents had been provided to the SEC without reservation. 112 The court noted that an express, contemporaneous reservation or
stipulation indicates that the disclosing party has made "some effort" to
preserve the privacy of the privileged communication. The stipulation
also would show that the privilege was not being abused through a knowing decision to waive the rule's protection in one set of circumstances and
later to retract the decision when it becomes disadvantageous in subsequent litigation. The court therefore concluded that if documents were
provided to the SEC under a protective order, stipulation, or other express reservation of the producing party's claim of privilege, no waiver
would be implied. I 13
Teachers represents a well reasoned compromise position on waiver
of privilege in the context of regulatory agency disclosures. It has not
gained a following outside the jurisdiction of the Southern District of
New York. In the Fulbright & Jaworski case, the District of Columbia
Circuit refused to find that the corporation maintained its privilege despite disclosure of confidential data to the SEC. The court held that letters exchanged between the Fulbright firm and the SEC warranted no

110.
Ill.

112.
113.

decisons, Bucks County Bank & Trust Co. v. Stork, 297 F. Supp. 1122, 1123-24 (D.
Hawaii 1969) (testimony of client at hearing seeking return of illegally seized property not a "general waiver" of attorney-client privilege) and United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256, 259 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 (1961)
(waiver of privilege against self-incrimination by disclosure to federal agents did not
constitute waiver of privilege asserted by witness in subsequent tax court proceeding
brought by employer seeking redetermination of tax deficiencies). Neither of the
cases cited provide a principled explanation of the concept of limited waiver of testimonial privileges. The Diversified court supported its limited waiver finding with the
comment that "Diversified disclosed these documents in a separate and non public
SEC investigation." 572 F.2d at 611.
Id.
521 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N. Y. 1981). Teachers involved an action by a corporate pension fund, which held certain stock warrants, for damages arising from an insurance
company's failure to honor the warrants. The insurance company moved to compel
the pension fund to produce documents it had turned over to the SEC in response to
an agency SUbpoena. Id. at 639.
Id. at 646.
Id.
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expectation of confidentiality for the materials made available to the
agency. 1 14 The mere assertion by the Fulbright firm that the submissions
were made in confidence, without a waiver of any privilege against disclosure, did not protect the privilege, at least absent evidence that the
SEC had agreed to these terms. ll5
In light of the Teachers opinion, when disclosure of confidential
materials to the SEC is anticipated, counsel for corporations should assert the attorney-client privilege and, in instances where it is applicable,
the work product immunity doctrine, and obtain assurances of confidentiality from the SEC before turning over attorney-client or work product
materials. Otherwise, the corporation runs a serious risk of waiving the
privilege when client confidences or work product material are voluntarily submitted. When a corporation is deciding whether to participate in
voluntary disclosure programs, corporate counsel should consider this
risk.
1.

Disclosure to Outside Auditors

Under the Supreme Court's case-by-case approach, corporations
generally have not fared well in their attempt to shield legal advice incorporated in their tax and accounting records. This has been particularly
true with respect to litigation with the Internal Revenue Service.
In United States v. El Paso Co., 116 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld an IRS request for a corporate taxpayer's "tax-pool" analysis of contingent liability for additional taxes. ll7
The analysis was prepared to insure that the corporation had set aside on
its balance sheet a sufficient amount to cover contingent tax liability. The
corporate taxpayer claimed that the analysis was protected by the attorney-client privilege. The Fifth Circuit rejected this contention, noting
that the tax-pool analysis was revealed to outside corporate auditors as
part of the outside auditors' annual audit for verification of the corporation's financial statements. llS The court therefore concluded that the
analysis lacked the requisite confidentiality of privileged attorney-client
communications. 1 19
The corporate taxpayer's contention that the work product immunity doctrine also shielded the information similarly was dismissed. The
Fifth Circuit observed that the tax-pool analysis did not appear to have
been prepared in anticipation of litigation, noting that the function of the
auditors' work product was simply to support a figure on a financial bal114.
115.
116.
117.

738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
/d. at 1372-74.
682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982).
A "tax pool" is a noncurrent tax account charged to a corporation's balance sheet to
cover contingent, deferred tax liability. generally constituting the spread between
maximum corporate tax rates and the actual rate at which the corporation's taxes
have been calculated. [d. at 534-35.
118. [d. at 540.
119. [d. at 542.
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ance sheet. 120 The purpose of the tax-pool analysis-to comply with SEC
regulations-struck the court as carrying "much more the aura of daily
business than . . . of corporate combat." 121
Similar results have been reached in other cases. The United States
Supreme Court appears to have endorsed the El Paso approach in United
States v. Arthur Young & Co. 122 As in El Paso, the Supreme Court found
that a "compliance assurance" audit by an independent accounting firm
did not enjoy work product protection. 123 In light of Arthur Young and
El Paso, the utility of the work product provided by a public accounting
firm must be considered carefully before a decision is made to retain the
accounting firm for investigatory work or otherwise to assist counsel at
trial.
2.

Inadvertent Disclosure

Considerable litigation has developed concerning the issue of
whether "waiver" of the attorney-client privilege or of work product immunity results from the inadvertent or accidental disclosure of protected
information. In the context of corporate litigation, large-scale document
production sometimes results in the accidental delivery of a privileged
document to an opponent. Under such circumstances, the issue becomes
whether a waiver occurred and, if so, the extent to which the attorneyclient privilege or work product immunity is waived.
In Chubb Integrated Systems v. National Bank, 124 the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia recently held that the inadvertent disclosure of privileged information during an overseas document
production constituted a complete waiver of evidentiary privilege. 125 Voluntary disclosure to an adversary, although unintentional, was held to
waive both the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity. The
court observed that the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity "should be available only at the traditional price: a litigant must
maintain genuine confidentiality."126
In an attempt to avoid an unduly harsh result under similar circumstances, the court in Champion International Corp. v. International Paper
Co. 127 found a waiver, but limited the scope of the waiver. The plaintiff in
a patent infringement action inadvertently produced documents reflecting attorney-client communications. 128 Defendants then filed a motion to
compel production of all other documents related to the infringement
action that were withheld by the plaintiff on the basis of attorney-client
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 544.
Id.
104 S. Ct. 1495 (1984).
Id. at 1504; see supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
103 F.R.D. 52 (D.D.C. 1984).
Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 67.
486 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
Id. at 1330-31.
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privilege, arguing that the privilege had been waived. 129 The court acknowledged that the voluntary disclosure of a privileged communication
ordinarily operates as waiver of the privilege as to other privileged communications concerning the same subject. 130 The court, however, citing
overriding considerations of fairness, found that the accidental release of
a small number of privileged documents "in the course of exhaustive discovery and in the spirit of openness, cooperation and reason" constituted
a waiver only as to the documents actually produced, not to other privileged material. 131
Document production during the course of litigation presents an obvious risk of inadvertent production of privileged material. Attorney control and supervision of such document production is essential to avoid
inadvertent waiver of important evidentiary privileges. If, however, a
document is inadvertently disclosed, counsel must rely on the public policy underlying the Champion decision and argue that an accidental act
performed in a good faith attempt to comply with discovery should not
carry the penalty of a complete subject-matter privilege waiver.
V.

EFFECTIVE PRESERVATION AND ASSERTION OF THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK
PRODUCT IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

The key to successful assertion of the attorney-client privilege and
the work product immunity doctrine in the corporate setting lies in anticipating and avoiding problems. Corporate counsel must establish appropriate policies regarding employees' contacts with in-house and outside
counsel concerning matters that may lead to litigation. Records of contacts between corporate employees and corporate counsel must reflect
that the purpose of a particular conference was to seek legal, as opposed
to business, advice.

A.

Confidentiality

In-house counsel's records and files must remain confidential. Memoranda should be distributed only on a need-to-know basis, and under no
circumstances should sensitive information be disseminated to persons
outside the privilege. 132 When counsel anticipates litigation during the
preparation of a memorandum, record, or report, the document should
reflect that fact. Information gathered for use by attorneys should indicate on its face that the information was gathered at counsel's request. At
129. /d. at 1329-30.

130. Id. at 1332.
131. Id. at 1333.
132. See, e.g., Western Fuels Ass'n v. Burlington N.R.R., 102 F.R.D. 201, 203 (D. Wyo.
1984) (disclosure of work product to friendly litigant in a related case is not beyond
the scope of the privilege); Barr Marine Prod. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D.
631,634 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (privilege waived if communication made in the presence
of a third party).
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least one court has refused to hold sensitive corporate memoranda immune under the work product immunity doctrine merely because the litigation-related purposes of the memoranda were not apparent on their
faces.l33

B.

Early Assertion

The SEC cases teach that evidentiary privileges should be asserted
at the outset of contact with governmental agencies and investigators and
reiterated on a frequent basis, even if cooperation with the agency is anticipated. If possible, commitments of confidentiality should be obtained
in writing from the agency prior to disclosure of confidential information. Litigants should seek a protective order or a written stipulation reserving the privileges in the event that privileged information is
communicated to regulatory agencies. If such an agreement is unavailable, the corporation may wish to reevaluate the benefits of voluntary
cooperation in light of potential subsequent evidentiary ramifications.

C

Internal Investigations

If a corporate "housekeeping" committee needs to interview corporate employees concerning possible violations of law, all the employees
interviewed must be made aware of the litigation-related purposes of
their contacts with inside and outside counsel. Through the use of this
procedure, a corporation will be able to meet the requirements of Upjohn
for asserting the attorney-client privilege. In the process of conducting an
in-house investigation, the corporation must avoid publicizing or making
testimonial use of the details of the investigation; otherwise, such actions
may constitute waiver.134 Attorneys must not provide expert or other
witnesses with copies of work product material or attorney-client communications in preparation for their testimony. Any such evidentiary use
of privileged material is apt to result in a finding of waiver.

D.

Fraud or Misconduct

Finally, an attorney must be alert to the possibility that a client is
involved in fraud or other criminal misconduct. Corporate attorneys
should be aware that any communications involved in the perpetration of
ongoing fraud or criminal activity will not be privileged. If the existence
of such communications becomes known to the government or to an opponent in civil litigation, the communications will not be protected. 135
An attorney's lack of awareness regarding a criminal purpose underlying
a corporation's contacts with him makes no difference in applying the
133. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy, 102 F.R.D. 1, 9 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).
134. Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404 (D. Colo. 1983); Computer Network Corp. v.
Spohler, 95 F.R.D. 500 (D.D.C. 1982).
135. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983,731 F.2d 1032 (2d
Cir. 1984); United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
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attorney-client privilege and the work product immunity doctrine. 136
Neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product immunity
doctrine protects communications made in pursuit of a crime or fraud.

E.

Appellate Review of Privilege Rulings

To protect the interests of a client in the confidentiality of materials,
obtaining appellate review of an adverse privilege ruling is essential. Refusal to produce the material without seeking appellate review subjects
the attorney and his client to significant punishment, including contempt
of court. 137 In addition, failure to seek precompliance appellate review of
a disclosure order may prevent any effective review. Once privileged material is disclosed, its confidentiality as a practical matter irretrievably is
lost.
Discovery orders are interlocutory in nature. 138 In federal courts,
orders denying the application of a privilege can be appealed only
through certification of the question by the trial court or by means of an
extraordinary writ. 139 Prompt and consistent assertion of a privilege and
maintaining the confidentiality of the privileged material pending appellate review are necessary prerequisites to obtaining appellate review of
discovery orders. Even if appellate review is obtained, reviewing courts
are reluctant to overturn the reasonable exercise of a trial court's discretion in applying the privileges. l40 Thus, invoking the jurisdiction of a
court of appeals to protect confidential material must be viewed as a "last
ditch" measure which, despite counsel's best efforts, is not likely to
succeed.
The standard for granting a writ of mandamus is a strict one. Unless
the trial court's discovery order exceeded its jurisdiction or amounted to
an abuse of discretion, mandamus will not lie. 141 Some appellate courts,
such as those in California, refuse to allow immediate review of decisions
granting discovery.142 Only refusals to permit discovery generally are
136. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d 1032,
1038 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir.
1977).
137. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(I); see also Southern R.R. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119 (5th
Cir. 1968) (corporation refusing compliance with court order to produce allegedly
privileged documents was held in contempt).
138. See, e.g., Montgomery County Council v. Kaslow, 235 Md. 45, 200 A.2d 184 (1964)
(circuit court order compelling the giving of depositions held interlocutory and nonappealable); Smiley v. Atkinson, 12 Md. App. 543, 280 A.2d 277 (1971) (denial of
motion for physical exam held interlocutory), affd, 265 Md. 129, 287 A.2d 770
(1972).
139. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2006, at 2936 (1970).
140. See Grinnel Corp. v. Hackett, 511 F.2d 595 (1st Cir. 1975) (discovery order did not
involve such "clear usurpation" of judicial power to justify writ of mandamus), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1976).
141. EEOC V. Carter Carburetor Div., 577 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom.
ACF Indus., Inc., Carter Carburetor Div. V. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081 (1971).
142. See, e.g., Brown V. Superior Court, 137 Ariz. 327, 670 P.2d 725 (1983) (trial court
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considered appealable before trial. I43 Other courts require a discovery
issue to have significant effects beyond the immediate litigation before
they will grant review pursuant to a writ of mandamus. 144 It is therefore
clear that an attorney's best efforts to protect the privilege must be made
early, at the trial court level, in view of appellate court reluctance to
review discovery orders.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Attorneys for corporations have a duty to protect the attorney-client
privilege and work product immunity on behalf of their corporate clients.
In the corporate setting, protecting the attorney-client privilege and work
product immunity is not always a simple matter. Confusion and unpredictability are reflected in court rulings on attorney-client privilege and
work product immunity. Furthermore, the Upjohn case-by-case analysis
of the attorney-client privilege and the work product immunity doctrine
has not provided clear standards to guide corporate counsel. Cases finding waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity
similarly should affect significantly corporate decisions to voluntarily
comply with governmental investigations. It therefore is impossible to
guarantee a client favorable decisions with respect to the attorney-client
privilege and work product immunity when these protective devices are
asserted in civil litigation and enforcement proceedings. Nevertheless, by
utilizing basic principles of confidentiality and documentation in all contact with corporate directors, officers, and employees, an attorney can
improve greatly the odds that a claim of attorney-client privilege or work
product immunity asserted with respect to efforts on behalf of his corporate client will be upheld.

has broad discretion as to discovery which will not be overturned absent clear
abuse); Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 785, 647
P.2d 86, 183 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1982) (appellate court must conclude that answers
sought by a given line of questions cannot as a reasonable possibility lead to discoverable information); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 161, 171,
465 P.2d 854, 861, 84 Cal. Rptr. 718, 725 (1970) (liberal policies underlying discovery counsel against overturning the trial court's discretion granting discovery).
143. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 161,465 P.2d 854, 84 Cal. Rptr.
718 (1970).
144. In re Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1980); In re Attorney General of the United
States, 596 F.2d 58, 63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Socialist Workers' Party V.
Attorney General of the United States, 444 U.s. 903 (1979).

